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(Mich. 1921), 183 N. W. 731. The force of filed rates is seen by the holding that the consignee was liable to pay the full amount of freight according to the filed rates, although it had previously paid all the charges asked by the carrier. *N. Y. Central & Hudson River R. Co. v. York & Whitney Co.*, 41 Sup. Ct. 509, and also by the holding that the carrier could recover freight from the consignor, when it had agreed to recover it from third parties who could not meet the full claim. *Chicago & E. R. Co. v. Lightfoot et al.* (Mo. 1921), 232 S. W. 176. The principal case is in accord with the previous views of the supreme court as to the right of other carriers to limit their liability, and to enforce their stipulations regardless of assent or dissent, although it is subject to what appear to be the reasonable and sound objections of Justice Pitney in his dissent to *Boston & Maine R. Co. v. Hooker*, *supra*.

CHILD—MEANING OF IN STATUTE ALLOWING ACTION FOR DEATH.—A statute gave to the wife, husband, parent or child of the deceased a right of action for death by wrongful act. Another statute allowed illegitimate children and their issue to inherit from their mother and from each other. Plaintiff was the mother of an illegitimate child killed through the negligence of defendant. *Held*, plaintiff had no cause of action. *State for use of Smith v. Hagerstown & F. Ry. Co.*, (Md., 1921) 114 Atl. 729.

In another very recent case, *Panama Ry. Co. v. Castilla*, 272 Fed. 656, the court held that as there was no statute in the Canal Zone making a bastard child legitimate as to its mother, she could not recover for her child's death by wrongful act of defendant. Undoubtedly the majority of decided cases in point in this country and England are in accord with the instant case, but it is submitted that they are based upon an unwise policy and an unfortunate following of bad precedent. For authorities and more extended discussion, see 19 MICH. L. REV. 562.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—FEDERAL TAX LAW EFFECTING REGULATION OF CHILD LABOR UNCONSTITUTIONAL.—Plaintiff sought an injunction to restrain collection of a tax levied pursuant to the Act of Feb. 24, 1919, § 1200 (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, 6336 7/8a), which imposed a 10 per cent. excise tax on net profits of certain employers of child labor. Tax law *held* unconstitutional as an attempt on the part of Congress, not to collect revenue, but to control the internal affairs of a state. Injunction granted. *George v. Bailey* (1921, W. D. N. C.), 274 Fed. 639.

The court, in the principal case, considered itself bound by *Hammer v. Dagenhart*, 247 U. S. 251, where the Supreme Court, in a 5 to 4 decision, declared the Owen Keating Act unconstitutional. Purporting to exercise its authority under the commerce clause of the Constitution, Congress had provided, in that Act, that the products of child labor should not be shipped in interstate or foreign commerce. Though ostensibly an exercise of power to regulate commerce, the Act was held to be an unlawful attempt by Congress to enact a police measure regulating child labor within the states.